The new world disorder: The prospects for peace by Clements, Kevin P.
TFF logo FEATURES
The new world disorder:
The Prospects for Peace
IA and the quest for peace and justice 2002
Opening Speech, Donor Day
 
By
Dr Kevin P. Clements
Secretary General, International Alert
 
 October 4, 2002
 
Introduction 
This time last year the September Board Meeting was overshadowed by the appalling
terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York. In my introductory talk to
donors then, I noted that this horror would prove to be a "hinge event" which would
seriously challenge many taken for granted assumptions about international relations and
the international rule of law. I noted that such a brazen attack on the most powerful
nation in the world would generate a strong and decisive military response. I signalled
that the strong instinct for revenge, which 9/11 generated, should be tempered by respect
for the international rule of law under the leadership of the United Nations.
In the light of the events of the past week the question is whether the rule of international
law or the rule of force and power will prevail. If I have a text it comes from that
American exponent of non-violence, Martin Luther King. It was he who said: "Wars are
poor chisels for carving out peaceful tomorrows". The challenge facing all of us is what
sort of chisels the "War against terror" and the impending US war against Iraq are in
relation to carving stable peaceful relationships, respect for the international rule of law
and the promotion of economic, social and political justice.? In particular , how do we
develop deeper and more fundamental questions about the development of new and
creative ways of dealing with violence and ensuring -wherever possible-that violence is
contained and only ever considered when all non-violent options have been exhausted in
the management and settlement of conflict.
In this speech I will discuss the problem of terrorism one year after September 11th
2001, the significantly changed global situation in which International Alert has had to
work this year. I will then consider the roles for conflict transformation organisations such
as International Alert and finally introduce some questions about how we measure our
impact and effectiveness
 
Terrorism
The first thing that has to be stated is that terror and terrorism are not new phenomena. In
fact the use of terror to achieve different objectives dates back to antiquity. Between 66
and 73 AD, for example, the Jewish zealots used terrorist violence to fight the Romans in
occupied Judea. They assassinated individuals, poisoned wells and food stores and
sabotaged Jerusalem's water supply. [1] Between 1090 and 1272 AD a Muslim Shi'a
group called the Assassins attacked Christian crusaders throughout the Middle East. "If
an assassin lost his life during an operation he was promised an immediate ascent to
heaven, a promise still used by the leaders of some Muslim terrorist groups to encourage
martyrdom in suicidal attacks." [2]
The words terror and terrorism assumed popular currency during the French revolution.
In this context terrorism referred to state sponsored top down efforts to rule and govern
through terror. It is important to remember this original understanding of terrorism - states
can and do terrorize their own citizens and those of other nations when it suits them to do
so. President Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe and President Sadam Hussein are egregious
examples of this top down type of terrorism.
Terrorism, however, can be an effective political instrument of the weak and oppressed
as well. The state of Israel, for example, was brought into existence under pressure from
the Jewish Stern and Irgun terror organizations. Two well-known Israeli terrorists (at
least they were terrorists to the British - the Israelis called them freedom fighters) Yitzhak
Shamir and Menachim Begin both became Israeli Prime Ministers. Nelson Mandela was
imprisoned as a terrorist as was Jomo Kenyatta. Both became Presidents of their
countries. One could go on.
There are high levels of subjectivity in the definition of who is a terrorist or what is a
terrorist act and many of the attempts to define this term have been made in the context
of groups which specific governments consider politically threatening rather than in terms
of clearly defined or specific terrorist acts.
The Oxford English dictionary defines a terrorist as:
"Anyone who attempts to further his views by a system of coercive
intimidation" as "a member of a clandestine or expatriate
organization aiming to coerce an established government by acts of
violence against it or its subjects."
The FBI regards terrorism as
"The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives." [3]
Paul Wilkinson in his 1986 book on the subject says
"What distinguishes terrorism from other forms of violence is the
deliberate and systematic use of coercive intimidation." [4]
The British government in its attempt to define terrorism officially in the British Terrorism
Act 2000 defines terrorism as
"The use or threat of action where the use or threat is designed to
influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the
public, and the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a
political, religious or ideological cause. Action falls within the Act if it
involves serious violence against a person, involves serious damage to
property, endangers a person's life other than that of the person
committing the action, creates a serious risk to the health or safety of
the public or a section of the public, or is designed seriously to
interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system." [5]
Rich Rubenstein of ICAR defines it as follows:
"Terrorism is violence by small groups claiming to represent massive
constituencies and seeking by "heroic" provocative attacks to awaken the masses,
redeem their honor, and generate an enemy over reaction that will intensify and
expand the struggle." [6]
As Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox put it:
This problem of a definition masks a deeper problem of the need to
resolve the grave conflicts that give rise to terrorism. We need an
international consensus on definition in order to isolate and eliminate
all sympathy and support for terrorism but we can't reach this
definition unless we work harder to deal with the underlying conflicts.
Let's face reality. So as long as there are weak, oppressed and
aggrieved people and groups who can find no redress, there will be
terrorism, and what for one man is a terrorist, will continue to be
another's freedom fighter. Of course, there will always be terrorists
whose causes have no merit and who must be defeated. I do not
recommend, however, that we give up trying to win a consensus that
terrorism is an unacceptable political weapon under any
circumstances. In the search for a more peaceful, humane and civilized
world, we need to keep trying to absolutely delegitimize terrorism in
favor of more civilized forms of political action. [7]
 
Definitional differences aside the main point is that terrorists and terrorism are not a
recent phenomenon. On the contrary, in recent history throughout the 1970s and through
much of the 1980s, the United States dealt with terrorist attacks from a number of
sources in different parts of the world. For example, there were a number of U.S.
Ambassadors killed in the early 1970s (e.g. in the Sudan and Lebanon). The Iranian
hostage crisis occurred in 1979 and that same year the American Ambassador to Kabul
in Afghanistan was kidnapped and murdered. The U.S. Embassy in Beirut was blown up
in 1983 followed by the bombing of the U.S. marine barracks at Beirut airport that killed
241 men. There were bombings of U.S. installations in Saudi Arabia (June 25 1996)
followed by the bombings of U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7 1998.
At the same time there were numerous instances of terrorist acts in Northern Ireland,
Spain, Greece, Turkey, and then the systematic top down and bottom up terrorism that
became genocide in Rwanda and Burundi where hundreds of thousands died. There have
been a variety of diplomatic and military actions taken in response to each of these events
but nothing that could be called a sustained war on terrorism.
While horrific, these earlier events did not have the visceral immediacy of 9/11 because
they took place abroad and were not filmed in real time by most of the world's media. It
is a source of some grievance to those who experienced these other acts of terrorism that
they did not receive the same recognition and global acknowledgement as 9/11. On the
contrary there is a sense of inequality in sensitivity to global pain especially for others who
have experienced tragedies as calamitous as those that afflicted New York and
Washington six months ago.
Commentators and observers of these past acts of terrorism feel that there was nothing
new in the 9/11 events that had not in some way or other been anticipated in earlier
terrorist incidents both against the U.S. and against a wide variety of other targets in
Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. The novelty of the 9/11 terrorist acts lies in their
combination, their lethality and the fact that they occurred on U.S. soil. As Niall Ferguson
put it "Apart from its kamikaze character, it was essentially a multiple hijacking." [8]
 
The Global Situation
International support for the United States and the so-called "War on Terror" was
overwhelming between September and December 2001. Certainly condemnation of
terror and terrorist tactics in politics was near universal. The UN response was also very
positive. Security Council resolutions 1373 and 1377 ,passed immediately after 9/11
gave the US and the global community international justification for removing the odious
Taliban regime and for combating all forms of terrorism. They generated more sustained
activity in the Department of Political Affairs (specifically the Committee on Counter
Terrorism) than most other recent UN initiatives. The Committee on Counter Terrorism
galvanised the international community to work to ensure that nation states, regional
organisations and the UN developed capacity to deal with terrorist threats in a timely and
efficient manner. It has received 180 reports on national capacity to defeat terrorism and
many specific initiatives to generate the broadest possible fight against international
terrorism. This is an unprecedented amount of support for a UN initiative. It has also
helped generate much higher levels of shared information, and coordination between
national, regional and global intelligence, police and military agencies than before.
Instead of building on this global goodwill to provide courageous and enlightened political
leadership; the US administration and military, have made a number of decisions and
mistakes which have perplexed many political leaders and dissipated much of the global
unity of September-November 2001. The reality is that the United States had near
universal support in the last 3 months of 2001 which rapidly eroded in the first 3 months
of 2002. It did so because of concerns such as the following.
The violent suppression of the revolt at the Mazar-E-Sharif Prison; the possible
complicity of the US in the Shiberghan massacre; the dubious jurisdictional status of Al-
Qaida prisoners at Guantanamo Bay as well as concern about their living conditions and
treatment; the killing of 3,600 Afghan civilians; the injudicious remarks about North
Korea, Iraq, and Iran being "an axis of evil"; the direct challenge to the International
Criminal Court and desire for US exemption from its provisions; support for the
repressive activities of Ariel Sharon in Israel and confused signals sent to the Palestinian
leadership; a stated desire for regime change in Iraq and a preoccupation with Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction without mentioning others that have such weapons or are in
the throes of developing them; the development of alliances with nations that have very
mixed human rights and other records in order to pursue the War on Terror; not to
mention assertion of unilateral US right against regional and multilateral interests. [9] The
new spirit of American isolationism can be further seen with the US withdrawal from the
Kyoto Convention; the low level representation to the Johannesburg summit on
Sustainable Development and America's direct challenges to a variety of multilateral arms
control agreements.
Most of these incidents have arisen because the United States is the world's unchallenged
power and is asserting this power in as many bilateral, regional and multilateral for a as
possible. In so far as the US is able to define its interests and values as global it generates
near irresistable pressures for most other nations in the world. This would not matter if it
were articulating multilateral values, asserting and abiding by the international rule of law
and leading the world in exemplary global citizenship. The reality, however, is that it is
asserting itself primarily as a military power able and willing to coerce when necessary to
secure its interests. The new US Force Doctrine 2020 aims for "Full Spectrum
Dominance in the air, in space, on land and on the sea". Within the US it is the
Department of Defence and the National Security Council which is pre-eminent in
defining the agenda of the War against Terror and in promoting regime change in
Baghdad.
United States military might is now greater in terms of scope and lethality than that
available to any other military power in world history. The US defence budget is $379
billion after a recent rise of 14%. This is the biggest rise in 20 years. The defence budget
is larger than the combined total of the next nine biggest defence spenders. The US is
responsible for about 40% of the world's military spending. It has 247,000 troops and
civilians posted overseas with a presence in more than 130 countries covering every time
zone. The US has 13 military bases in countries around Afghanistan. It has a military
presence in Uzbekhistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgistan and Georgia , all former Soviet countries.
The department of defence employs 1.4 million people on active duty. It is the largest
employer in the US with more employees than Exxon Mobil, Ford, General Motors and
GE combined. The Department of Defense owns 40,000 properties covering 18 million
acres of land. It operates a fleet of more than 15,000 aircraft, including 20 stealth
bombers in service. The navy operates more than 1,000 ocean going vessels. The
Defence department buys enough fuel every day to drive a car around the world 13,000
times. The US headquarters at the Pentagon employs 23,000 workers and has 17 miles
of corridors. The US spends an average of $28,000 on research and development for
each member of its armed forces compared to the European average of $7,000. [10]
This overwhelming power, the mixed signals and the application of military force when
and as necessary by the US issues have raised deep concerns about US global goals and
its willingness to pursue these within internationally agreed frameworks and conventions.
President Bush's speech to the United Nations General Assembly on the 13th September
2002 followed a summer of unilateral and bellicose threat from the US to Iraq. The
Administration has left no-one in any doubt about the US stated goal of regime change in
Baghdad. The justifications for this have been somewhat tenuous. The best international
legal opinion is that the Iraqi rejection of past UN resolutions does not, in itself, justify
unilateral or even bilateral use of force against Iraq and certainly does not justify "regime
change". [11]
In any event, Iraqi acceptance of the unconditional admission of weapons inspectors
removes this justification in the short term. Recent US desire to prevent the United
Nations Inspection team from entering Iraq under the old mandate also generates
international concern. There is no "legal" justification for unilateral US military
intervention.The challenge facing the UN now is whether future Iraqi non compliance with
UN demands will trigger an automatic or near automatic application of Chapter 7
measures. This is by no means guaranteed and will be much more difficult to secure.
Despite greater international willingness to support the US after the President's address
to the UN, most nations feel that the US is engaging in a la carte multilateralism in order
to secure regime change rather than as a genuine desire to enforce the international rule of
law - as reflected in Security Council Resolutions? If it were the latter surely the US
would be looking much more systematically at all Security Council Resolutions which
have not been fulfilled and devising measures for ensuring universal compliance.
In any case all of these recent events at the UN are a challenge to the notion of sovereign
equality. There is no other nation in the world that could have persuaded the UN to pass
Security Council resolutions under threat of the unilateral use of force. US pre-
occupation with Iraq - no matter how bad the regime-- seems somewhat
disproportionate given all the other countries around the world whose leaders repress
their citizens and seek to develop weapons of mass destruction. What sort of
interventionist role does the US seek for itself in relation to these other countries and
what role do US leaders expect the UN and regional organisations such as the EU to
play in relation to their self appointed role of "global sheriff"? Is the world community
currently trapped by war rhetoric and embarked on another "March of Folly" of the kind
that led to the First World War or can regional and global organisations reassert their
authority and insist on more pro-active approaches to the peaceful settlement of
disputes?
The other challenge that has occurred post 9/11 has been a global tightening of security
at the expense of human rights and liberty. Many countries have introduced anti terrorism
laws, increased the powers of surveillance and detention without trial. Several have
extended their use of the death penalty and restricted freedom of expression and
worship. In the United States, itself, for example, 67% of the population in a recent
opinion poll were willing to sacrifice the First Amendment right of Freedom of Expression
in order to advance national homeland security. Many other regimes have also seized the
opportunity presented by "the war on terror" to justify more extensive domestic
repression-e.g Colombia, the Philippines, Uzbekistan, Egypt, Israel, and Kenya.
These macro dynamics are the backdrop against which International Alert is trying to do
its work. They are undoubtedly beginning to restrict the spaces for the expression of non-
violent alternatives to war. They are certainly aimed at the assertion of military rather than
diplomatic or negotiated solutions to problems. In Eurasia, for example, the Russian
desire to bomb Chechen rebels in the Pankisi Gorge (as part of its own war against
terrorists) has certainly placed a big question mark over the possibility of negotiated
solutions to the frozen conflicts in Georgia/Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Georgia,
Armenia and Azerbaijan. Similarly, defining the Maoist insurgency in Nepal as a "terrorist
war" and the liberation movements in the Philippines in the same way is having a very
negative effect on the development of peaceful processes for dealing with these problems
in Asia.
 
A Peacebuilding Approach to counter terrorism?
What has been missing in recent debates has been the peacebuilding dimension to the
war against terrorism. As the Americans have already found in Afghanistan military
solutions are only the start- after any war or violent conflict, it is vital that new regimes
are supported and a peacebuilding strategy developed. [12] The hard work of real
regime change starts once the military have left yet there has been little large scale
investment in this vital work. This is worrying given that the cost of conflict transformation
is significantly less than support of military operations yet there is significantly less spent
on conflict transformation than on conflict prevention. For example a single Tornado
fighter-bomber costs between 20 and 30 million pounds sterling which would be enough
to keep International Alert and its partners going for over six years. Earlier this year the
UK House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs in its report on the Foreign
Policy Aspects of the War Against Terrorism stated:
'We also need to determine how the conditions that have contributed
to the development of terrorism can be eliminated or at least reduced.
The answers to those questions will provide a far safer world than
even the best intelligence and preparedness can provide. As the war
against terrorism proceeds, this country and its coalition allies must
seek out those answers and must learn about and deal sensitively with
the causes of terrorism.' [13]
Organisations such as Alert are working to help provide answers to these questions by
addressing the underlying political, historical, economic and structural causes of violence
as well as their symptoms. This cost effective response to terrorism should not be
forgotten in the haste to move towards war. At International Alert we continue with our
work because we know that military solutions rarely deliver long-term economic, political
or social results. There is no alternative to that much more difficult and patient task of
developing processes aimed at long term and sustainable peacebuilding.
The question that we in the conflict resolution community have to ask is what can we
contribute from our tool box to make this open, vulnerable, interdependent world more
secure and resilient? What will remove the root causes of terrorist violence and how can
we do this so that 9/11 becomes an opportunity to develop institutions and processes
that help people address their deepest concerns and solve their problems without
recourse to suicide and violence?
I would like to make a clear distinction between the confusion that surrounds war (with
all its short term aims, objectives and inevitable confusions) and the clarity that should be
guiding what I call the much more problematic, long term, painstaking task of the quest
for justice and peace and the holy grail of peace, justice, truth and compassion or what
some think of as that place called reconciliation. How do we ensure that the quest for
truth, justice, peace, and compassion dispels the fog of war and generates some realistic
alternatives to the apocalyptic promise of war, famine, pestilence and death?
Euripides, way back in antiquity stated that "reason can wrestle and overthrow terror".
So the first thing that has to be said, therefore, is that there is no way in which the quest
for peace and justice can be engaged and terrorist threat diminished unless there is a
willingness to apply the best, the most creative and the most empathetic intelligence to the
task of diagnosing and analysing the real nature of the problems generating concern. This
means acknowledging that sometimes inaction can be positive; it means reminding
politicians with short term time horizons of the importance of thinking in terms of what
Elise Boulding calls a "two hundred year present". This means learning from the wisdom
of those centenarians who are still alive today and making wise and reversible decisions
on behalf of those born today since these babies have a reasonable chance of living a
hundred years from now. There is a human obligation not to make damaging, short term
irreversible decisions which may prejudice the future of the newly born. In addition to the
morality of this, thinking long term helps contextualise contemporary problems and
challenges. It also helps us understand something of the cycles of violence and non-
violence and when it is most appropriate and inappropriate to intervene.
The second challenge is for political and military leaders to articulate and share their
visions for the future since there is no quest without a vision and as the Bible reminds us
"without vision the people perish". I do not have any clear sense of what vision the United
States leadership adheres to at the moment, nor for that matter do I have a clear sense of
what vision Prime Minister Tony Blair adheres to either. I would like to quote from a
former US President Dwight de Eisenhower to illustrate the difference between
Presidential and Prime Ministerial visions in 1953 and now.
"The way chosen by the United States was plainly marked by a few clear
precepts, which govern its conduct in world affairs. First: no people on
earth can be held, as a people , to be an enemy, for all humanity shares the
common hunger for peace and fellowship and justice. Second: no nation's
security and well being can be lastingly achieved in isolation but only in
effective cooperation with fellow nations. Third: any nation's right to a form
of government and an economic system of its own choosing is inalienable.
Fourth: any nation's attempt to dictate other nations their form of
government is indefensible. And fifth: a nation's hope of lasting peace cannot
be firmly based upon any race in armaments but rather upon just relations
and honest understanding with all other nations.
In the light of these principles the citizens of the United States defined the
way they proposed to follow, through the aftermath of war toward true
peace. This was faithful to the spirit that inspired the United Nations: to
prohibit strife, to relieve tensions, to banish fears . This way was to control
and to reduce armaments. This way was to allow all nations to devote their
energies and resources to the great and good tasks of healing the war's
wounds, of clothing and feeding and housing the needy, of perfecting a just
political life, of enjoying the fruits of their own free toil. Etc". [14]
 
Third, the quest for peace and justice needs to begin with the interests and needs of the
weakest and most vulnerable. Are these people who are often most severely damaged
by violent conflict and the insecurity that flows from it. Too much of the war against
terrorism is being articulated by privileged elites for their purposes rather than for and on
behalf of impoverished people who experience daily existential terror at being unable to
satisfy their basic human needs. It is important, therefore to ask how and in what ways
the current war against terrorism is going to help or is currently helping the weak and the
vulnerable. Where are the consultations and discussions with the dispossessed, the
internally displaced, the refugees, and those who are suffering in a variety of extreme
political and economic environments? Starting with the most vulnerable populations and
incorporating them into the analysis /diagnosis of the sources of terrorism is critical to
legitimating the quest for peace and justice. This orientation contrasts very strongly with
top down decision making based on Solomon's trap of non consultative decision,
announcement and defence.
Fourth, given the shadowy nature of terrorist violence, it is difficult identifying who the
key stakeholders/parties are and who has an ability to prevent violence against innocent
civilians. Those interested in long term conflict prevention, therefore, need to spend time
trying to discern the specific parameters of terrorist violence and which actors and issues
are most likely to choose or trigger terrorist options. This is a very serious problem for
our field since there is a strong disinclination on the part of most terrorists to engage in
conversations with "do gooder" problem solvers. On the other hand we do not have
much evidence that these individuals and organisations are interested in talking to those
who are applying military solutions either. So we need to spend time and energy on
mapping the contours of terrorist activity and identifying who does and who does not
wish to converse about the dynamics propelling them into extreme terrorist activity-
suicide and violence. This is clearly not a job for the fainthearted and cowardly but it
needs to be done if we are interested in discovering who may be able to represent the
interests of those who are willing to engage in violent acts to advance their cause. Gaining
access to terrorist, guerrilla or rebel organisations is extremely difficult, however, and
requires a lot of patience and a slow movement from outer to inner circles. Someone has
to do this though if we are to move beyond arm chair theorising to try and identify the
needs and motivations of terrorist groups. To do this properly will require a very
sophisticated understand of what sorts of incentives might induce such groups and
individuals into discussions. In particular there is a need to understand how amnesties and
other inducements might be applied to begin engaging these individuals and groups. [15]
This is all long term and difficult work in very taxing environments.
Fifth, if we manage to make contact, it is important that there be flexibility about process
and a willingness on the part of the external intervening parties to let the terrorist groups
identify who they would like to communicate with , set the initial agendas and to what
socio-political end. Conflict resolvers need to assume the role of ethnographer/
anthropological analyst rather than problem solver in the first instance. This is going to be
very difficult because there will be little or no inclination on the part of the terrorist group
to extend trust to those who might be acting for intelligence agencies or foreign powers.
Once trust and confidence have been developed it might be possible to think of more
normal problem solving roles. It is particularly important, however, that considerable
attention be devoted to such issues as not appearing or actually offering impunity to such
persons because most of the evidence suggests that terrorists appreciate "firmness" and
clarity of boundaries than softness, concessions and inconsistency. [16]
Sixth, as can be seen from the first five challenges, the quest for peace and justice
requires considerable courage. It is not a task for those seeking a quiet and tranquil life.
This courage requires a new look at the concept of "heroism". The Roman poet Martial,
stated that "My hero is he who wins praise without bloodshed". [17] As A.C Grayling
noted in an insightful little essay on this subject, while heroism manifests itself in self
defence against malign aggression or in the interests of principle all other fighting and
killing, squabbling and destroying never does.
"On the contrary, heroism is first and foremost the property of
peacemakers. It takes infinitely greater courage to salvage a people or an
epoch from a conflict than to start or continue it. The outstanding figures of
our time, among whom Nelson Mandela is the exemplar, are those who
seek reconciliation, forgiveness-very milksop notions , no doubt in the view
of people who think it cleverer to let their guns do their thinking and
talking." [18]
The problem is that when reason gives way to frenzy or calm reflective judgement gives
way to revenge it becomes difficult to hear those who espouse alternative perspectives.
Where are the voices against the war in the US right now ?
The seventh challenge has to do with the right sharing of the world's resources. Even if
we can find courageous heroes on all sides of the terrorist/non terrorist , violence/non
violence divide we still have some deep rooted, intractable structural violence to contend
with. Globalisation has generated more rather than fewer inequalities and it has cursed us
with something that earlier generations did not have to contend with; namely an ability to
see the suffering of others in real time and across vast distances and yet a terrible inability
to respond to that need directly and in the same real time. In the past if we were made
aware of the need and suffering of others we could do something about it directly-give
alms, develop welfare systems etc. Now we see the suffering and then respond
indirectly-if at all. There is no collective ability to act globally and no global institutions yet
capable of redistributing goods and services when and as needed. This is why the
achievement of global poverty reduction targets by 2015 is so critical. [19]
The UNDP notes that 1 billion people in the world cannot satisfy their elementary needs.
Among 4.5 billion residents of developing countries, three in every five are deprived of
access to basic infrastructure; a third have no access to drinkable water, a quarter have
no accommodation worthy of its name and a fifth have no use of sanitary and medical
services. In 70-80 of the 100 or so "developing countries" the average income per head
of the population is today lower than 10 or even 30 years ago. At the same time, three of
the richest men in the world have private assets greater than the combined national
product of the 48 poorest countries; the fortunes of the 15 richest people exceed the
total product of the whole of sub Saharan Africa. [20] According to UNDP less than 4%
of then personal wealth of the 225 richest people in the world would suffice to offer all
the poor of the world access to elementary medical and educational amenities as well as
adequate nutrition.
The eighth challenge has to do with the promotion of democracy, human rights and good
governance . El Qaida , for example, had no interest in these things nor do most of the
Middle East nations. Al Qaida are much more interested in the re-emergence of the
caliphate and the imposition of Islamic theocratic rule. Equally, however, regimes which
they oppose (e.g the House of Saud, the Egyptian and Iraqi governments and some of
the Gulf States were not interested in more inclusive, participatory government either.
Similarly, throughout Africa (if the Zimbabwe elections are a guide) there is a willingness
to sit lightly on issues of good governance. The challenge facing conflict resolvers is how
to put these issues -and associated issues of corruption, transparency and clean as well
as inclusive government-on the table without appearing to or actually imposing a Western
agenda.
Ninth, the small amount of research that has been done on the psychology, sociology and
politics of terrorist activity suggests the need for more understanding of what combination
of positive and negative incentive will yield changes in terrorist behaviour and a
willingness to think about alternative non-violent processes for dealing with their personal
and political problems. The war against terrorism is extremely unclear about its
objectives.
Tenth and finally, it is vital that the United States does not personalise terrorism as a US
problem nor see the war against terrorism or the problems posed by Saddam Hussein as
America's problems alone. In the days immediately after 9/11 there was genuine
international outpouring of support for the US in its condemnation of terrorism and
terrorist activity. The US administration in pushing unilateral solutions since remains in
danger of spoiling this opportunity to mould a better world in collaboration with others.
This opportunity requires sustained national, regional and multilateral effort. It requires the
United Nations and it requires all individuals everywhere renouncing violence in general
and terrorist violence in particular as unacceptable strategies for promoting political
purposes.
It is certainly vital that there be no military adventurism in relation to Iraq. This is the
moment to get UN inspectors back in to the country not to use UN weapons inspectors
as a pretext for another US war in the Middle East. If the US and its allies do not back
off a war in Iraq they will generate accusations of international double standards at work
; namely that it is alright for the US to apply its military might in pursuit of its national
interests but not alright for other countries. This will generate all sorts of awesome and
unacceptable consequences in return not least of which will be an accelerated recourse to
assymetrical warfare on the part of America's enemies. This will mean heightened
vulnerability for the US rather than heightened security.
This is the time for the US in collaboration with others to accelerate peace initiatives in
Palestine and Israel (a heroic quest demanding courageous leadership). It is the time for
the reconstruction of Afghanistan and for making sure that more resources are directed
towards sustainable development everywhere in the world. This is the time to begin
addressing terrorist activity through national police services, and Interpol and to keep
military power in the background.
The elimination of terrorism at its roots requires a much more courageous quest for peace
and justice than opening up new military fronts. It requires the enunciation of carefully
calibrated non-violent steps, options to generate better understanding between the
Middle East and the West (since 90% of the world's terrorist groups are located there).
It requires a willingness to suspend but not abandon military options. On the contrary
these coercive options should be kept firmly in the background as a last resort should all
other less violent efforts and initiatives fail.
This is a big task for conflict resolvers but it is a noble one. Our object is not cathartic. It
is not to exact revenge for 9/11 and feel good in the process. (This is not the wild west
thank goodness). Rather the task is to bring terrorists to justice for the crimes that they
have committed. To hear these cases in internationally acceptable courts and to work to
ensure that the root causes of terrorism and terrorists are eliminated. This is a never
ending quest rather than a short airborne war or the rapid overthrow of odious regimes.
We are watching recent global events with great concern and recommit ourselves to
working with others to enlarge the space for civil society groups to work harder on
creating spaces for analytic and collaborative problem solving. We do so in the hope that
we can continue to expand the range of non-violent options available to political leaders
and thereby circumvent the use of the military. We have decided to focus on impact and
effectiveness at this year's donor's meeting. This is a response to the stated needs of both
donors and professionals in the field and part of our on going internal discussion about
the ways in which we can deepen the professionalism of peacework and enhance better
peace practice.
 
Impact and effectiveness
Supporting organisations such as International Alert is a cost effective way of dealing with
the instability that we see in the world today. Despite our relatively small cost, however,
donors and governments want to know that they are getting value for money and that we
are being effective in our work. We, (i.e IA) wants to know also that our work is making
a difference and how ( in close collaboration with partners) we can maximise our
peacebuilding effectiveness.
At minimum we need to know that our interventions are not going to generate harm for
people. More optimally we want to ensure that our work makes some small contribution
toward the ending of wars and the building of just and sustainable societies within which
individuals and groups can resolve differences/conflicts non-violently.
This means that we need to become much more sophisticated about the nature of the
relationship between processes (methods) , outputs (activities), outcomes (tangible and
observable consequences) and impacts ( long term changes in violent attitudes, behaviour
and institutions). None of these things are simple and we need better quantitative and
qualitative indicators to help us understand these dynamics . We also need to be clearer
about the theoretical assumptions we bring to our work and ways of ensuring that our
process/intervention designs are related to our theoretical assumptions, contextual
analyses and the specific needs of stakeholders in the conflict. A lot of this work is
related to what we are doing within our development and peace building programme-
especially the work that we are doing on Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)
---- but it is something that all programmes need to become more intentional about as we
engage in on going analysis and evaluation of all our work.
The normal project cycle goes through three specific phases-(i) analysis/design of
projects (ii) implementation and (iii) evaluation, feedback and changes to the original
design. In each of these areas as we have discovered in our Better Peace Practice
project we can and must become more reflective about what we do and the
consequences of what we do.
Dr Kenneth Bush - who has helped us conceptualise many of these issues feels that there
are at least four areas in which to explore the wider peacebuilding impacts of a project. .
- Did the project produce substantial numbers of politically significant
changes in access to individual or collective material and non material
resources? : for example, access to water, land, food, political institutions
and processes, economic resources, social and or cultural status,
information , legitimacy , authority.
- Did the project create, exacerbate or mitigate socio-economic tensions :
Did it serve to reinforce privileged access by one group over others in
economic, educational, agricultural , industrial sectors or did it serve to
reduce hierarchies and dependencies in these areas?
- Did the project produce substantial changes in the material basis of
economic sustenance or food security: for example, did it provide new
techniques/technology that directly affect livelihoods. Did it minimise the
opportunities for warlordism?Did it create local economies capable of
opting out of the political economy of civil conflict?
- Did the project produce challenges to or changes in content of or control
over existing political, economic and or social systems? Did the project
serve to empower individuals/groups to assert control over the political ,
economic, social aspects of their lives: to challenge existing systems of
control and to develop alternative systems of governance?
He identifies five concrete reference points that might help us look in the right locations
and ask the right questions to determine the overall impact and effectiveness of our work.
The areas he outlines and which have been developed by FEWER/Saferworld and IA in
our PCIA project are as follows.
Has the project/programme in question helped enhance
1. Institutional capacity to manage, resolve violent conflict and to promote
tolerance and build peace
2. Military and Human Security
3. More democratic political structures and processes
4. Sustainable, accessible and fairer economic institutions and processes
5. Social reconstruction and empowerment.
 
These different reference points ( from which endless indicators have been developed by
all sorts of groups) should help us to focus our attention when doing analysis , clarifying
assumptions about causality of conflict, contextualising our work, working out the utility
of different sorts of dialogue processes and providing us with better and smarter ways of
monitoring and evaluating our work.
None of this is easy. If we are to establish smarter ways of determining the impact and
effectiveness of our work then we need to
1. Have clear base line information about what it is we are seeking to
change and why?
2. Understand the short term, medium term and long term goals-of projects,
programmes and more macro policy frameworks-- and why we think that
the pursuit of these goals will have a positive impact on the conflict in
question.
3. Have some understanding about why the particular methods we are
employing to advance these goals in our work - needs assessments,
dialogue processes, trust and confidence building, creative accompaniment,
partnerships, training programmes, NGO fora etc -- are likely to work.
That is what is the theory of change or conflict that is being applied and why
do we think that this will work?
4. Understand something of what is politically possible in each of the
conflict zones within which we work. To what extent is this work providing
"bandaid solutions" and leaving unjust, unequal, undemocratic political
institutions intact? Are we paying enough attention to the mobilisation of
radical, inclusive peaceful political movements capable of fundamental
system change where this is necessary?
5. Maintain the right sort of relationship with our partners so that we do not
impose a northern, didactic , mechanistic approach to our work. How do
we develop a relationship that enables local control, flexibility, maximal
levels of responsiveness to local needs etc etc
6. Understand the nature of the relationship between micro processes at
programme/project levels, with wider community based processes and then
national and regional processes. This is an underdeveloped area of our
work. Without imposing any methodological straitjacket it would seem
useful to have a more coherent sense of the ways in which micro processes
have macro impacts and vice versa.
7. What impacts/consequences can we attribute to specific types of action?
There is a need for more sophisticated "systems thinking" in relation to the "
attribution problem". There is also a need to acknowledge that the ability of
any individual, group or organisation to have final,determinate effects on
deep rooted and intractable conflict is extremely limited. These conflicts
cease through a wide variety of factors-some planned, some unplanned,
some predictable and some not.
 
There are many different ways of addressing this impact and effectiveness question. It is
on the agenda of many organisations at this time. It is a question asked by donors, it is a
question asked by partners. One of the things that we wish to do at this meeting is
provide some space for some of our partners to tell us what they have or have not found
helpful about our engagement with them. This will be the basis of much of the discussion
in the afternoon.
The point is that there is no (and maybe never will be) final agreement on criteria of
effectiveness but there is an emerging consensus that a number of these criteria have to
be included in any reasonable assessment of what constitutes effective peacebulding.. I
am hoping that we will be able to add other critreria and refine these ones at our
discussions this afternoon.
As you can see from IA's Annual Review, we have been working hard over this past
year to build on our Better Peace Practice Project to ensure that all of our own
programmes are focussed on delivering measurable outputs, outcomes and the best
possible evaluation of their wider peacebuilding impact .
We are integrating and focussing our work at local, national, regional and global levels .
In doing so we continually ask what is the long term peace building significance of this or
that activity.
Even though macro global dynamics-fuelled by the war on terror--seem to be moving in
directions which are a long way from delivering sustainable peace; the processes that we
are involved in within the Great Lakes and Kivus, in West and East Africa, in Eurasia, Sri
Lanka , Nepal and Colombia, not to mention all the research and advocacy that we are
doing with national governments, regional and multilateral organisations is making a small
but vital contribution towards generating short and long term alternatives to violence. The
challenge facing all organisations like ours is how to enlarge the spaces for peaceful
dialogue; how to insist that non-violent solutions to problems are generated and
exhausted before violent ones are proposed; and how to deal with all those individuals,
groups and governments who are intent on applying force first and asking questions
afterwards. We stand ready and willing to explore these questions with you and we hope
that we may generate some mutually acceptable and generative solutions.
On behalf of the whole organisation I wish to thank you for all the material, moral and
political support you have given us over this past year and in previous years.
Even though this century has not got off to a very auspicious start I remain convinced that
it will eventually become a century of maturity, peace and justice. This will only happen
however if individuals, states, intergovernmental organisations and civil society actors (i)
acknowledge the limits of nationalism in a tightly interdependent world (ii) commit
themselves to the difficult task of harmonising indidvidual and national interests in regional
and global networks and institutions (iii) develop deep habits and instincts for multilateral
consultation and dialogue (iv) prioritise human security as the major objective of
economic and public policy and diminish the excessive reliance on military security and
(v) start reconceptualising citizenship so that it includes some sense of the four fold rights
and obligations of citizens at local, national, regional and global levels. Only when each of
us assigns as much significance to our global as well our local/national citizenship will the
sovereign claims of each individual be taken seriously. It is at such time that we will be
able to say that we are living in a socially responsible world. IA alongside a wide variety
of courageous local partners in many complex conflict zones is doing its part to turn some
of these dreams into reality. We trust that you will continue to support us in this effort.
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